Odin Knudsen
The Uruguay Round marks the eighth time countries. In many industrial countries, the since the end of World War II that the memmain objective of agricultural policies has ber countries of General Agreement on Tariffs been to stabilize and increase farmers' inand Trade (GATT) have attempted to negoticome. In countries that experienced wartime ate a reduction in trade restrictions and proshortages, these income goals have been suptection. Previous rounds of negotiation have plemented with a drive to achieve selfhad remarkable success in reducing trade prosufficiency in food production. Support of tection. Average tariffs in major industrial farmers' incomes and the efforts to achieve countries have been reduced from about 40 self-sufficiency have contributed to rapid techpercent in the 1940s to less than five percent nological change, higher growth in production, after the Tokyo Round which concluded in and accumulation of large stocks. Now many 1979. This reduction in import barriers has industrial countries are searching for policies been a key factor in the ninefold increase in that would counteract excessive production world trade and the fourfold increase in world and would reduce the enormous budgetary GNP in real terms since 1950.
subsidies to farmers while maintaining farm Although the developing countries have incomes and rural economies at politically gained from previous rounds, in most cases, acceptable levels. those gains have been limited. Agriculture, In many developing countries, the stated obone of the most important sectors for developjectives of agricultural policy in terms of rural ing countries in terms of employment, export incomes and self-sufficiency are similar to those earnings, and income, has been kept outside of of many industrial countries. The actual outthis negotiating process. The Uruguay Round, come of their policies however has been by proposing to extend the GATT's reach dramatically different. Direct and indirect taxover agriculture, as well as to textiles, servation of domestic agricultural production and ices, intellectual property, and "gray area" exports has hindered growth of the sector. measures such as voluntary export conOver-valued exchange rates and protection of straints, offers the possibility of directing domestic manufacturing, which has turned the more of the benefits of liberalized world trade internal terms of trade away from agriculture, to developing countries. As such, it is the most and food subsidies and price controls in urban important and ambitious of the negotiating areas have contributed to the depressed state rounds and will play a large role in determinof agriculture in developing countries. While ing the growth and prosperity of developing industrial countries, by way of agriculture subeconomies for decades. sidies that exceed US $100 billion per year, are awash in surpluses, developing country im-THE WORLD AGRICULTURAL ports continue to grow, irrigation systems POLICY DILEMMA deteriorate, agro-industry largely stands in The state of agriculture and the policies ruin, and export earnings from agriculture directed at the sector are dramatically difstagnate. Meanwhile, rural-to-urban migration ferent between industrial and developing accelerates and hunger persists both in cities
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and in the countryside. vide rough approximations of the potential stability in trade, political uncertainty, and gains and losses from a successful negotiating limited market access could characterize inround in agriculture. For example, the World terational agriculture markets for developBank estimates the efficiency gains to the ing countries. Such an outcome would indeed world economy from removing protection and be a dismal one. intervention in both developing and industrial When compared to this worst case scenario, countries to exceed U.S. $40 billion (in 1980 the gains from participating in the process are prices). Roughly half these gains would be thus great even for those countries that aprealized by developing countries.
pear to lose in these comparisons of current These estimates of worldwide gains mask protective states to liberalized trade in agritwo important aspects of trade liberalization.
culture. An even more restrictive and governAccording to the World Bank estimates, if the ment controlled system of trade in agriculture liberalization proceeded only in industrial would have dire consequences for most countries while government invervention condeveloping countries. Developing countries tinued in developing countries, the developing should then have a strong impetus to parcountries as a whole would be net losers on ticipate and actively influence the negotiaticipate and actively influence the negotiathe order of U.S. $12 billion. Furthermore, tions in the Uruguay Round. While some among developing countries themselves, the developing countries recognize the imporconsequences of trade liberalization would diftance of the agricultural negotiations andhave fer substantially, with net food-importing taken an active role, mainly through the countries such as those in Africa and parts of Cas groups, many countries remain on the Latin America losing and net exporting counsidelines, viewing the negotiations as essentries such as Argentina gaining. The losses to tially being between industrial countries, some of the developing countries are priprimarily those countries represented by the marily a result of the rise in primary comEuropean Community (EC) and the United modity prices and their growth of dependence Stat on wheat imports in the 1970s and 1980s. It is important to note that estimates of the price T C rises and losses to net food-importing coun-E CO NTF tries resulting from trade liberalization are DVL IN UN I mitigated by the model's assumption that supBesides the major concern that the negotiatply controls such as acreage set asides are ing process would fail or reach an unsatisfacremoved. If supply controls continue or are tory solution, developing countries have other expanded to other countries, the losses to concerns over the outcome of even a suc-60 cessful Uruguay Round. These concerns cerned with how they will finance the adjustrelate to: (1) the transitional period and the ments that may be required of their economies. structural adjustments required by a new inIf food prices increase, some countries that ternational trading environment; (2) the interalready have balance of payment deficits and nal political sensitivity with respect to food are major food importers would be unable to security; (3) loss of preferential treatment; (4) meet their debt-servicing requirements or the types of interventions that potentially would have to cut back on other necessary imwould be permitted; (5) the availability of food ports such as capital goods. Furthermore, aid and other foreign assistance; and (6) the with public investment and expenditure possibility that industrial countries will imbudgets already restricted by the economic pose supply controls either as an interim or crisis, many developing countries would find it long-term measure. Concern has also been exdifficult to respond to the new opportunities pressed over the long-run stability of a world offered by higher and different relative prices agricultural system based on more. liberal for agricultural commodities. trade.
International facilities, however, do exist In the proposals of the Cairns group, of the that could ease both the short-term balance of EC, and of the Japanese, the need to address payment problems and fund the structural adthe concerns of developing countries has been justment process. Besides their normal explicitly acknowledged through offering the balance of payment lending, the International possibility of special and differential treatMonetary Fund (IMF) has various compenment for developing countries. However, as satory facilities including the Compensatory yet this special provision has not been transFinance Facility and the Enhanced Structural lated into specific actions or proposals. FurAdjustment Facility, while the EC has the thermore, the U.S. proposal makes no offer Stabex Scheme. The World Bank also has for special treatment for developing countries.
funds for financing adjustment processes. The exact nature of how developing countries However, the IMF, the Stabex, and the World will be treated in the negotiations remains Bank facilities are designed to handle more unspecified and heightens the uncertainty of random and isolated events and may be inthe negotiations for the developing countries.
sufficiently funded to compensate for a more We will now address each of these concerns.
global event having an impact on many countries, as would be the case with a major ad-THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND justment in world agriculture. For example, THE REQUIRED STRUCTURAL World Bank lending for structural adjustment ADJUSTMENT has been effectively limited to around 20 perThe major proposals currently on the cent of its annual commitments or about U.S. negotiating table recognize that it will take $3 billion. This limit has already been reached many years to fully liberate agricultural by current requirements for supporting structrade. The United States has proposed a tentural and sector adjustments in developing year period for the removal of all intervencountries. To support adjustments of a larger year period for the removal of all intervenscale would require more resources beyond tions and supports. The Cairns and EC proscale would reuire more resources beyond posals both offer a two-phased approach, an would eithe nd to ri countries immediate freeze in subsidies and intervenwcres to the need to uts orize capitl tions followed by other measures over an uncres to te a n iity thations or schemes or specified longer period. support a new facility that could finance the specified longer period. The developing countries have two concerns requirements of the adjustment process. with respect to the transition. First, they are worried about the consequences of the "emer-FOOD SECURITY AND gency" measures, in particular if they imply SELF-SUFFICIENCY ISSUES market-sharing arrangements which would Many politicians have promoted the rhetoric limit their export possibilities or restrict the of food security and self-sufficiency for their availability of imports. Furthermore, the countries. Although this rhetoric could be short-term temporary measures, in the view directed at production of an array of food of the developing countries, might become crops, it is usually directed at self-sufficiency permanent measures if the negotiating procin a single staple, for example, rice in Asia and ess drags on or the political will to negotiate parts of Africa, wheat in Africa and parts of diminishes.
Latin America, and maize in, Mexico. These Second, the developing countries are concommodities have been designated by govern-61 ments for special incentives, either through TYPES OF SUPPORT AND higher protection or support prices, or special INTERVENTION PERMITTED subsidies on inputs. For these politicians now The U.S., EC and the Cairns Group have to argue for increased reliance on internaproposed to use the Producer Subsidy Equivational markets for the supply of these foods lent (PSE) as a key measure of support and inwould be difficult and unpopular. Regardless tervention for agriculture in the negotiations. of the argument that supply of these commodiAs currently defined, the PSE includes an arties would become more certain through reray of interventions from direct border liance on world markets, the political imperameasures such as tariffs to research and extive may dictate "special treatment" being tension and infrastructure. Although border given for supporting these commodities up to measures including non-tariff barriers clearly some negotiated percentage of selfinfluence trade flows, and should be consufficiency. Such a concession, although reducsidered in the negotiations, other supports to ing the market for exporters of these staples, agriculture such as public expenditures on inwould probably not significantly distort interfrastructure, research, and extension are less national trade. Recognizing that "sacred directly trade-distorting and should remain cows" exist would be one way that special conoutside the negotiations. sideration could be given to some developing Developing countries would reject a PSE countries.
measure that includes development expendi-
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
tures. For developing countries, expenditures on research and extension and on other types Despite the underlying GATT principle of of public-good activities are part of the demost-favored-nation, whereby all member velopment process. This then is clearly an countries must receive trade benefits ven area where special treatment could be another country, a clause in the Agreement granted to developing countries. has permitted developed countries to grant special preferences to developing countries through tariff concessions. Currently about 25 FOOD AID developed countries give special preferences t d oin c .' One of the key means of transferring to developing countries.
Since these special preferences are selective assistance to developing countries has been Since these special preferences are selective food aid, either through bilateral donations and are at the discretion of the granting counfo a, ther through bilaral doti try, they can be divisive to the unity of such as the U.S. PL480 program orby multilateral grants through the World Food Prodeveloping countries and could be used as a grat ough te World Food Promeans by which countries can be punished by Although food ad remains contrverthe granting go m for v s a l sial because of its possible disincentive effects the granting governments for various actual to agricultural production in the recipient or alleged economic or political offenses. Furto aricutura prouction in te r thermore, many agricultural commoditiesare coun, t an important instrument of excluded from the preferences or are redevelopment assistance, one which many excluded from the preferences. or are redeveloping countries want continued. Several stricted by non-tariff barriers, thus limiting developing countries want continued. Severa their usefulness.
of the proposals include provisions for humaniSome cou s tt vw t noton tarian assistance and the orderly disposal of Some countries that view the negotiations stocks. However, the U.S. proposal is silent myopically will place high priority on mainstos oee te os is taining their preferential treatment. Others on the issue of food aid. As government support to agriculture decurrently without preferences will attempt to As government support to aiculture decnines, surplus public stocks available for food have the coverage extended to their own countries. Commodity groups in developed aid will diminish or possibly disappear. Food countries. Commodity groups in developed aid, which historically has been integrated countries may use the issue of preference to a w ed alating tariffs, hereby pro with the disposal of surplus public stocks, will preserve "eclaig"arfsbecome more dependent on the purchase of essed commodities are levied at a higher rate prtehed toc o r purchase of than the raw commodity. As a consequence, privately-held stocks. However, purchase of than the raw commodity. As a consequence, developing countries may have much to lose private stocks could be subject to abuse. In from insisting on preferential treatment and practice,it will be difficult to establish if most likely little gain government purchases are meeting requiremost likely little to gain. ments for supplies for food assistance or are constituting price or other types of support for agriculture. Even if it were required to match purchases and food aid donations, the would of course pay the costs. In industrial timing of purchases and deliveries could be countries, these costs would be only a small used to support agriculture. The potential for part of total private expenditures, perhaps a abuse, or the possibility of governments erectlesser amount than consumers in the EC and ing "gray" area interventions under the Japan are currently paying. auspices of food assistance, may require that This concern that the negotiations would restrictions be placed on government purturn to supply controls has in part motivated chases for food assistance. These restrictions, net food-importing countries to attempt to combined with generally lower levels of world form a coalition against these and other possifood stocks, would raise concern about the ble initiatives-so far unsuccessfully. To adequacy and reliability of food assistance alleviate this concern, the developed countries among food deficient developing cotvtries.
would have to exclude such measures unless As with assistance to short-term and longerthey are clearly conservationist in nature. term structural adjustment, developed counWhile the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has tries could establish a special fund for the compublicly come out against supply controls, petitive purchase in international markets of other major negotiating groups so far remain food for development assistance. If the fund silent on the issue. were administered by a "neutral" multi-GLOBAL AGRICULTURE STABILITY lateral agency such as the World Food Program or Council, this food assistance could be International prices for agricultural comlargely independent of national agricultural modities have always been volatile. Simulaprograms.
tion models indicate that with trade liberalization this volatility would be reduced by about SUPPLY AND PRODUCTION ten to 15 percent. Nevertheless, considerable SACONTROL MEASURES volatility would remain that would foment the desire of many governments to buffer both Some of the discussion associated with the consumers and producers from price fluctuamultilateral trade negotiations has been about tions. Although efforts to stabilize domestic "bringing supply into balance with demand." prices have generally been costly, many If this refers to allowing prices to be the developing countries will nevertheless want equilibrating mechanism through free and to continue with price stabilization schemes. uninhibited markets, it would be consistent This desire would become even greater if with the objectives of promoting international unexpectedly price volatility increases cointrade and providing a better allocation of the cidentally or as a consequence of the trade world's productive resources. The concern of liberalization. Although futures and options the developing countries is that it does not markets could be used to transfer risk, they mean equilibrating supply and demand would not necessarily reduce price fluctuathrough price but through supply controls.
tions. Futhermore, the constraints on the The developing countries have good reason movement of capital, as is common in developfor their concern. Through the acreage set ing countries, make futures markets generally asides and conservation reserve programs, infeasible. However, until this concern over the United States could potentially pull 80 milprice volatility and risk management is satislion acres, or 20 percent of their cultivated factorily addressed, it will remain an imporacreage, out of production. Furthermore, the tant issue for developing countries. EC has instituted controls on the production of dairy products and is currently discussing FINAL THOUGHTS production controls for cereals. Controls on
The Uruguay Rounds of agricultural trade production represent for the industrial counnegotiations are important to the well-being tries a low-cost mechanism of satisfying the and growth of both developed and developing objective of income support to farmers with countries. The Uruguay Round has progressed minimum budgetary outlays while at the same well so far, with major proposals having been time politically uniting environmental and placed on the negotiating table. While the conservation coalitions with farmers' groups.
negotiating positions of the industrial counIf the Cairns group can also be brought along tries appear to be well prepared, not much atinto implementing supply control measures tention appears to have been given to the conthrough the promise of higher prices, then the cerns of the developing countries other than necessary conditions for effective worldwide the general acceptance of the need for special supply control would be achieved. Consumers dispositions. If the Uruguay Round hastens to resolve the immediate problems of agriculture term viability of any agreement will be in developed countries, while failing to adethreatened. With the debt crisis constraining quately account for the concerns of and the imthe possibility of rapid adjustments in the pact on the developing countries of agrieconomies of many developing countries, such cultural trade liberalization, then the longa neglect would have global repercussions. REFERENCE Word Bank. World Development Report, 1986 . New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 
